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¶1 In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court 
overruled nearly 100 years of antitrust precedent, and rewrote a rule that had become 
intertwined in numerous branches of the law.  In his dissent, Justice Breyer predicted that 
the decision would “create considerable legal turbulence.”2  This article explores the fears 
of the four dissenting Justices, and examines the jurisprudential disturbances created by 
Leegin in the area of patent licensing.  Specifically, this article focuses on the multi-
billion dollar industry of technology transfer at research universities,3 and investigates 
possibilities created by the Leegin rule. 
¶2 In Leegin, the Supreme Court held that resale price maintenance agreements 
between a product manufacturer and independent resellers would no longer constitute per 
se violations of the antitrust laws.  Rather, courts must apply the rule of reason, and 
invalidate such agreements only if net anticompetitive effects have been proven.  4
¶3 This paper posits a novel licensing practice for research patentees,5 to maximize 
royalty streams while simultaneously benefiting the upstream research community and 
downstream consumers.  Specifically, the use of temporary price maintenance across 
multiple non-exclusive licenses could simultaneously meet the needs of research 
patentees and manufacturing licensees, while alleviating the burdens created by exclusive 
licensing practices on upstream research and downstream prices.6  However, the opacity 
of the law governing price restraints in patent licenses threatens to stifle development of 
new transactional methods.7  Therefore, this discussion is acutely important to stimulate 
development of new practices in the wake of Leegin. 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law, 2009.  I would like to express 
gratitude to Professor Stephen Reed for his insights. 
1 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). 
2 Id. at 2737. 
3 See Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress:  Are Universities Adding to the Cost?, 43 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2007). 
4 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2710. 
5 The term “research patentees” will be used to denote entities like research universities who prosecute 
patents, but do not manufacture products. 
6 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development:  Patents and Technology 
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1709–10 (1996) (“[Exclusive 
licensing] provid[es] the means of excluding competitors from the market for the product. . . . [B]y 
charging monopoly prices without facing competition, . . . the firm preserves for itself the rents from 
product development.”). 
7 David F. Ryan, Current “Patent-Antitrust Interface” Issues and Their Potential Effect on Patent 
Litigation, 923 P.L.I. PAT. 235, 253 (2008) (describing the “absence of a clearly controlling Supreme Court 
precedent” on whether price restraints are allowed in manufacturing patent licenses, thus counseling that 
“sound practice requires avoiding price-fixing terms”). 
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¶4 This article argues that price restraints in patent licenses issued by research 
patentees should be treated leniently under the antitrust laws, according to both the 
reasoning applied in Leegin and the economic incentives of these licensors.  In fact, due 
to the procompetitive benefits such price restraints could create, they should 
predominantly withstand antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason.  Finally, given the 
inefficiencies of exclusive licensing currently used by university Technology Transfer 
Offices (TTOs), this alternative could at once prove profitable and broadly beneficial to 
government-funded research in the United States.  8
¶5 Part I summarizes the Leegin decision and identifies its limits, underscoring the 
open questions still faced by research patentees.  Part II looks for answers in the historical 
jurisprudence of patent license price restraints, from initial roots in the Dr. Miles rule to 
later manifestations.  Notably, much of this case law was premised upon horizontal patent 
licensing arrangements and is principally inapposite to vertical licenses.  Part III 
explicates the turbulent effects of Leegin on such precedent, and posits an approach for 
research patentees to capitalize on this chaos.  Given the substantial procompetitive 
advantages of the proposed licensing practice, analysis reveals that this approach should 
pass muster under the rule of reason.  Part IV concludes by introducing the real-world 
context of technology licensing at research universities.  It argues that the proposed 
methodology comports with the purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act,9 and could yield benefits 
to patentees, other researchers, and the public in general. 
I. LEEGIN—THE NEW RULE AND ITS LIMITS 
¶6 The Supreme Court in Leegin held that resale price maintenance (RPM) agreements 
would now be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis under the rule of reason, rather than 
constitute categorical violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.10  An RPM agreement 
is a contract between a manufacturer and reseller to fix minimum prices at resale.11  It is a 
“vertical” contract, made between parties at different levels of the supply chain.  12
¶7 The Court found that vertical price restraints could have socially beneficial uses, 
such as deterring free-riding by resellers and spurring non-price competition.13  
Furthermore, a purely upstream manufacturer has economic incentives to reduce market 
prices and increase the quantity of its goods sold.14  Hence, whereas entities engaged in 
retail are more likely to have anticompetitive incentives for fixing prices, upstream 
entities are motivated by “special reason[s]” unrelated to extracting monopoly rents from 
consumers.   Thus, the more permissive rule of reason, which enables a defendant to 15
 
8 See, e.g., Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share Alike:  Increasing Access to Government-Funded 
Inventions Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 393, 442–43 (2006) (“[University] 
researchers . . . should have a limited, royalty-free license . . . [to ensure that] those who need access to the 
basic technology covered by these patents will have it.”). 
9 See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000). 
10 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 2714 (noting the “differences in economic effect” between horizontal and vertical price 
restraints). 
13 Id. at 2715–16. 
14 Id. at 2718 (“[I]n general, the interests of manufacturers and consumers are aligned with respect to 
retailer profit margins.”). 
15 Id. at 2729 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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explain its reasons for using the restraint and the procompetitive benefits resulting, is 
appropriate for RPM agreements. 
¶8 From the 1911 decision in Dr. Miles until the recent Leegin decision, RPM 
contracts had constituted per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act.16  Mere agreement 
on price levels at resale, regardless of efficacy or negative impact, could incur civil 
liability, attorney’s fees, treble damages, and even criminal charges.17  Understandably, 
per se treatment had a chilling effect on business practices seeking to experiment with or 
circumvent the rule.  18
¶9 The rule of reason is now the “prevailing standard of antitrust analysis,”19 and in 
many ways the Leegin decision simply followed in the footsteps of other precedent that 
had gradually phased out per se treatment of vertical restraints.20  However, due to the 
long incumbency of the Dr. Miles rule and the special treatment of price maintenance by 
courts,  Leegin has resounding ramifications beyond the sphere of RPM contracts alone. 21
¶10 The licensing of intellectual property is one affected area.  In the patent licensing 
context prior to Leegin, there was a narrow avenue of categorical legality for a patentee to 
set the first sale price of a product licensed to a competing manufacturer.22  Around this 
“doughnut hole,” the Supreme Court and various Circuit Courts erected numerous 
barriers, precluding price control under a host of circumstances.23  This article focuses on 
the situation where a research patentee holds a patent but does not engage in product 
manufacturing, and wishes to control the sale price of the patented technology. 
¶11 Importantly, these are not resale price restraints, as the licensee transacts the first 
sale of the patented product.24  However, the absence of direct competition between 
patentee and licensee, and the economic perspective of each party, establish these 
licenses as purely vertical contracts.25  Hence, the Leegin rule should apply, and price 
restraints in these licenses should be adjudicated under the rule of reason. 
¶12 As one practitioner noted in anticipation of the Leegin decision, “companies 
wishing to exercise price maintenance in . . . licenses of intellectual property . . . without 
manufacturing [products] . . . would gain important new support.”   Courts have 26
 
16 See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
17 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 15 (2000). 
18 See William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL. L. REV. 933, 936 (1987) 
(“No one can know how many more enterprises would have availed themselves of resale price control 
agreements . . . .”). 
19 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
20 See id. (vertical non-price restraints); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1977) (maximum 
resale price fixing). 
21 See, e.g., Khan, 522 U.S. at 15–17 (“[W]e find it difficult to maintain that vertically imposed 
maximum prices could harm consumers or competition to the extent necessary to justify their per se 
invalidation . . . arrangements to fix minimum prices . . . remain illegal per se.”). 
22 United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 478–79 (1926). 
23 Robert A. Lipstein & Ryan C. Tisch, RPM in IP:  RIP to Per Se?, COMPETITION LAW 360 (Portfolio 
Media, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Apr. 9, 2007, at 2, 
http://www.law360.com/registrations/user_registration?article_id=22238 (“[C]ourts have nibbled away at 
[General Electric], leaving it a narrow rule surrounded entirely by wide exceptions . . . .”). 
24 See FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property § 5.2 (1995) [hereinafter “IP 
Guidelines”]. 
25 See County Materials Corp. v. Allan Block Corp., 502 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[V]ertical 
restrictions [occur] . . . when a patent owner (which does not compete in the manufacturing sector) imposes 
restraints on a manufacturing licensee.”). 
26 Lipstein & Tisch, supra note 23, at 3. 
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recognized the vertical nature of patent licenses between research patentees and 
manufacturing licensees.27  Nonetheless, as the Practicing Law Institute recently noted, 
“sound practice [still] requires avoiding price-fixing terms in manufacturing licenses,” 
because even after Leegin, there is no precedent clearly on point.28  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court’s prior decisions circumscribing the rights of patentees have not been 
overruled, deterring experimental business practices under the specter of per se liability.  29
II. THE HISTORIC ILLEGALITY OF PATENT LICENSE PRICE RESTRAINTS 
¶13 The origins of the rules governing patent license price restraints are convoluted, 
and Dr. Miles and other old cases surface at various points.  Also, the changes brought 
about by modern antitrust rules like Leegin are unclear—Leegin made no mention of 
patented products or price maintenance in licenses.30  This part traces patent licensing 
jurisprudence, to ascertain the changes effected by Leegin and modern antitrust analysis. 
A. The Dr. Miles Rule 
¶14 Dr. Miles involved unpatented medicinal products on which the manufacturer had 
imposed minimum prices for resale by its independent distributors.31  The manufacturer 
sued one retailer for breach of the contractual price provision, and the defendant 
challenged the validity of the contract under the antitrust laws.32  The Supreme Court 
invalidated the contract, holding that minimum resale price restraints constituted a per se 
violation of §1 of the Sherman Act.33  Under per se treatment, liability is incurred by the 
mere agreement on prices, regardless of the actual effects on competition or consumers. 
¶15 Notably, the Dr. Miles majority distinguished patented products and reserved the 
question for later adjudication.  Since “complainant ha[d] not seen fit to [obtain a 
patent],”  the Court did not address the “extent of the [patent] right.”  34 35
¶16 This question was resolved two years later, when the Court concluded that first sale 
of a patented product would “exhaust the right to sell as to which a [patent] monopoly 
was given,” hence resale price fixing of a patented product would also incur liability per 
se under the Sherman Act.36  In fact, this principle originated before Dr. Miles in the 
patent misuse doctrine, under which resale price provisions in patent licenses were 
deemed unenforceable.37  Under the Sherman Act, however, a patentee would 
additionally face liability for actual and treble damages, and suits could be brought by a 
licensee or the federal government.  38
 
27 See, e.g., id. 
28 Ryan, supra note 7, at 253. 
29 See Baxter, supra note 18, at 936. 
30 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007). 
31 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 394 (1911). 
32 Id. at 382, 395. 
33 Id. at 408–09. 
34 Id. at 402. 
35 Id. 
36 Boston Store of Chicago v. Am. Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 22–23 (1918) (citing Bauer v. 
O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913)). 
37 See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873). 
38 See Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (providing for private actions). 
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¶17 Prior to the Leegin decision, the per se rule was still in effect, as evidenced by the 
Guidelines published by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice 
(DOJ).39  The Guidelines cited United States v. Univis Lens Co., which concerned the 
sale of patented eyeglass lenses, under license for customization and resale at minimum 
prices.40  The Court unequivocally held that regardless of the patent rights, the price 
restraint “must stand on the same footing under the Sherman Act as like stipulations with 
respect to unpatented commodities.”41  Because Leegin changes this “footing under the 
Sherman Act” for RPM contracts generally, such restraints are no longer per se illegal, 
whether or not a patent applies. 
B. Patent Licenses and the General Electric Rule 
¶18 The situation is more complicated regarding price restraints on the first sale of a 
patented product.  Fifteen years after Dr. Miles, the Supreme Court addressed 
government claims against General Electric, which manufactured its patented light-bulbs 
and sold them to consumers via agents, and also licensed Westinghouse to make and sell 
the bulbs at fixed minimum prices.42  Considering the license provisions, the Court 
reasoned that the question directly implicated the “[scope of the] patentee’s monopoly.”43  
Unlike unlawful tying arrangements, which require licensees to use or sell the patented 
invention in combination with unpatented materials,44 the Court reasoned that “[t]he price 
at which a patented article sells . . . [has] more direct relation . . . to the rights of the 
patentee.”  Practically speaking, General Electric’s right to exclude competitors would be 
devalued if Westinghouse could undercut its prices and capture market share under a 
patent license. 
¶19 Though this language is broad, other parts of the decision and the underlying facts 
of the case have been invoked to limit the holding to its specific context.45  GE had issued 
a single license to its direct competitor, Westinghouse, and had used the price restriction 
to prevent the latter from undercutting its own sale prices.46  The Court noted that a 
“valuable element[] of the exclusive right of a patentee is to acquire [monopoly] profit.”47  
Hence, “[w]hen the patentee licenses another to make and vend and retains the right to 
continue to make and vend on his own account,” it may preclude price competition.  48
¶20 This phrase has been construed to exclude licenses issued by multiple patentees 
under pooling arrangements,  as well as price restraints imposed on multiple licensees of 49
 
39 IP Guidelines, supra note 24, § 5.2 (“[T]he Agencies will enforce the per se rule against resale price 
maintenance in the intellectual property context.”). 
40 Id. (citing United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942)). 
41 Univis Lens, 316 U.S. at 251 (citing Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States., 309 U.S. 436 (1940)). 
42 United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 478–79 (1926). 
43 Id. at 489–90. 
44 See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
45 See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 304 (1948) (“[General Electric held only 
that] where a conspiracy to restrain trade . . . is not involved, a patentee may license another to make and 
vend the patented device with a provision [fixing] the licensee's sale price . . . .”). 
46 Gen. Elec., 272 U.S. at 490. 
47 Id. 
48 Id.  This reasoning seems to recognize that it is better to have more than one manufacturer in the 
market even if prices are fixed, than to allow exclusive control by a single monopolist. 
49 See Line Material, 333 U.S. 287. 
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a single patent.50  Notably, these limitations were all articulated in the context of 
horizontal agreements between patentees and licensees who each manufacture and sell 
products.  As recognized in Leegin, while horizontal arrangements may often be 
anticompetitive and lead to higher prices, vertical agreements can benefit consumers.51  
Accordingly, although the cases interpreting General Electric did not differentiate 
between horizontal and vertical licenses, modern adjudication would likely be more 
precise. 
C. Patent Pools Under the Line Material Rule 
¶21 The General Electric decision came under fire by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Line Material Co., a case involving multiple patentees who had cross-licensed 
(or “pooled”) their patents to facilitate product development.52  In Line Material, the 
patentees each manufactured and sold the patented circuit-breaker devices, and further 
fixed minimum sale prices in licenses to other manufacturers.53  The District Court had 
upheld the price restraints under General Electric, and on appeal, the Government urged 
the Supreme Court to overrule its precedent.  54
¶22 The Justices split on the issue of overruling, and held:  “[W]hen patentees [agree 
to] prices on their several products, . . . [it] is unlawful per se under the Sherman Act.”55  
This limitation has proven effective.  For example, the Fifth Circuit cited Line Material 
for the rule:  “[General Electric] is unavailable where two or more patentees fix the 
prices of products incorporating several independently owned patents.”  56
¶23 More recently, however, the Supreme Court has issued other antitrust decisions that 
counsel against per se treatment under similar scenarios.  In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, the Supreme Court applied the rule of reason to blanket 
licenses issued by record companies, which fixed the prices for broad collections of 
copyrighted songs.57  It recognized that per se treatment was inappropriate, even though 
the pooling of copyrights constituted horizontal price fixing.  This was allowed because it 
would be “impossible for . . . individual copyright owners to negotiate with and license 
the users.”  58
¶24 The DOJ also recognizes the “benefits . . . from combining complementary 
inventions.”59  Yet, Line Material has not been overruled, and the specter of per se 
condemnation persists. 
¶25 However, even assuming Line Material remains valid, the rule does not apply 
directly to vertical agreements, where multiple research patentees have pooled their rights 
and collectively licensed manufacturers.  In Line Material, both patentees in the patent 
 
50 See Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1956). 
51 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2715–16 (2007). 
52 333 U.S. 287 (1948).  An interference involving the two patentees had assigned the claims in a way 
that product development would have been impossible without cross-licensing. Id. at 291. 
53 Id. at 293–95. 
54 Id. at 298–99. 
55 Id. at 314 (emphasis added). 
56 In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 541 F.2d 1127, 1135–36 (5th Cir. 1976). 
57 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
58 Id. at 5. 
59 Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., DOJ Antitrust Div., Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law, 
Address Before the American Intellectual Property Law Ass’n. 2 (May 2, 1997), 1997 WL 1187720. 
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pool competed with the licensees at the retail level.60  The patent pool thus constituted a 
horizontal conspiracy to eliminate price competition, purposed to allow the patentees to 
jointly reap monopoly profits.  “The unlawful element is the use of the control that such 
cross-licensing gives to fix prices.”61  When the agreements are purely vertical, the 
concerns over horizontal price fixing are inapplicable. 
¶26 Additionally, the doctrinal foundations of the Line Material decision have been 
shifted by the Leegin rule.  The Line Material Court stated that “[outside of the patent 
monopoly], a contract to fix or maintain prices in interstate commerce has long been 
recognized as illegal per se under the Sherman Act.”62  It cited both horizontal price 
fixing precedent and the Dr. Miles line of cases for support.63  After Leegin, only price 
fixing between direct competitors remains per se illegal, and vertical price maintenance 
in the non-patent context requires rule of reason treatment.  Hence, the premise in Line 
Material for vertical licenses now favors the rule of reason. 
D. Price Restraints Across Multiple Licenses 
¶27 Other courts have asserted an additional limitation on General Electric, holding the 
rule inapplicable where a “mere plurality” of licenses has been granted.64  The Third 
Circuit addressed the issue of a manufacturing patentee who had licensed two of its four 
competitors in a segment of the textile industry to use its patented method.65  Citing the 
numerous prior limitations imposed by the Supreme Court on the General Electric rule, it 
instituted yet another—one based more in linguistics than in logic.  The Third Circuit 
read the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the patent laws as “giving a patentee a right to 
license ‘another to make and vend at a fixed price’”66 to permit only one other license 
with price restraints.67  Hence, it held a “mere plurality” of licenses with price 
maintenance terms to per se violate the Sherman Act.  68
¶28 The Newburgh Moire decision has received widespread criticism, both scholarly 
and judicial.  Bound by the precedent, a district judge commented that “[t]here is much 
that could be said for and against the [decision].”69  At the time it was issued, a number of 
journal articles criticized the reasoning and normative propriety of the holding.70  Even 
today, citations to the opinion are typically accompanied by an epitaph like: “[the 
decision] arguably turned patent and antitrust principles on their heads.”71  Indeed, by 
deterring issuance of multiple licenses, the rule inhibits competition and confounds the 
 
60 Line Material, 333 U.S. at 293–95. 
61 Id. at 315. 
62 Id. at 307–08. 
63 Id. at 308 n.21. 
64 Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283, 292 (3d Cir. 1956). 
65 Id. at 291. 
66 Newburgh Moire, 237 F.2d at 292 (emphasis added) (citing Line Material, 333 U.S. at 312). 
67 Newburgh Moire, 237 F.2d at 292 (affirming the lower court’s reasoning). 
68 Id. at 293–94. 
69 Tinnerman Prods., Inc., v. George K. Garrett Co., 185 F. Supp. 151, 158 (E.D. Pa. 1960). 
70 See, e.g., Patent Price Restrictions and the Antitrust Laws: A Balance Upset, 67 YALE L.J. 700, 704 
(“[The] single-licensee interpretation appears technically unwarranted.”). 
71 2 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 16:6 (2007). 
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goals of antitrust law.72  Yet, the rule is not dead, and could impede research patentees 
licensing multiple manufacturers. 
¶29 Closer analysis reveals, however, that despite its sweeping language, the Newburgh 
Moire rule should not apply to vertical licenses.  As in Line Material, the circumstances 
of this case involved a patentee licensing its competitors to use and sell products of the 
patented method above maintained price levels.73  Furthermore, the precedents that the 
Third Circuit relied upon all involved horizontal conspiracies between competitors 
seeking to exploit their patent rights for the purposes of price fixing. 
¶30 One leading precedent was United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., where the Supreme 
Court addressed price-restraining licenses promulgated among “virtually all” drywall 
sellers.74  The Court found that such licenses facilitated a conspiracy among direct 
competitors to “organize the [entire] industry and stabilize prices.”75  Indeed, the Court 
reserved the question of whether a “mere plurality” of licenses involving price restraints 
could alone prove a price fixing conspiracy.76  Necessarily, illegality required the finding 
of a conspiracy, and the number of licenses issued was a factor towards this.77  In 
contrast, the Newburgh Moire Court obviated the requisite conspiratorial foundations. 
¶31 Additionally, the Gypsum Court held that “[i]t is well settled that price fixing . . . is 
illegal, per se,”78 citing footnote 21 of Line Material.  As discussed, that footnote listed 
both horizontal and vertical price fixing cases, only the former now remain per se illegal.  
Hence, the foundations of Gypsum no longer support per se illegality for vertical licenses. 
¶32 This point is illustrated by the United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc. decision,79 which 
was heavily relied upon in Newburgh Moire.80  In New Wrinkle, the Supreme Court dealt 
with facially vertical arrangements between a patent holding company and manufacturing 
licensees to fix sale prices of commodities produced under the patented method.  In 
finding the practice illegal, the Court stated that “the fact that New Wrinkle is exclusively 
a patent holding company [is] of no legal significance.”  81
¶33 However, as with Gypsum, this decision must be read in its context.  Here, though 
the holding company was a distinct legal entity and was vertically separated from the 
manufacturers competing in the industry, it had actually been formed by two of those 
competitors, who had colluded in order to fix retail prices.  The new company then 
proceeded to license, with price maintenance restraints, each of the more than 200 
competitors in the industry.82  Explicitly, the Court’s holding rested on the horizontal 
nature of the conspiracy involving the original patent holders.  “An arrangement was 
made between patent holders to pool their patents and fix prices on the products for 
 
72 Id. 
73 Newburgh Moire, 237 F.2d at 291. 
74 333 U.S. 364, 371 (1948). 
75 Id. at 401. 
76 See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 84 (1950) (“There was no holding in our first 
opinion in Gypsum that mere multiple licensing violated the Sherman Act.”). 
77 Id. (“[O]ur judgment [was] squarely on the basis that . . . ‘[defendants] had acted in concert to restrain 
commerce . . . [using] patent licenses.’”). 
78 U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 400. 
79 342 U.S. 371 (1952). 
80 Newburgh Moire Co. v. Superior Moire Co., 237 F.2d 283, 293 (3d Cir. 1956). 
81 New Wrinkle, 342 U.S. at 379. 
82 Id. at 374. 
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themselves and their licensees.  The purpose and result plainly violate the Sherman 
Act.”83  There was no mention of whether truly vertical price maintenance licenses would 
warrant per se treatment.  Again, under Leegin, a truly vertical arrangement should 
formally be accorded rule of reason treatment. 
¶34 Thus, the Newburgh Moire decision was overly broad in its holding, and 
overlooked the important distinction between vertical and horizontal price restraints.  
Today, vertical price restraints not involving patent licenses are judged under the rule of 
reason.84  As explained below, it is illogical to impose a per se standard on a patentee, 
when the underlying transaction remains vertical in nature.  Under Leegin, the Newburgh 
Moire rule should not apply to research patentees imposing price maintenance upon 
multiple manufacturing patentees. 
E. Non-Manufacturing Patentees 
¶35 A final case of note from the Ninth Circuit questioned, in dicta, whether a 
“nonmanufacturing patentee [could] . . . fix[] its licensee’s prices of the patented 
product.”85  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that while General Electric permitted a patentee 
to fix its competitor’s sale prices via a license, the Supreme Court has not answered 
whether a “nonmanufacturing patentee” falls within this rule.  The Ninth Circuit found it 
unnecessary to rule on the issue.  86
¶36 Indeed, the litany of Supreme Court and other cases limiting the General Electric 
holding suggest that nothing more than its narrowest construction survives.87  However, 
General Electric established a rule of antitrust immunity for price restraints in the patent 
license involved.88  That is, even if General Electric does not apply to non-manufacturing 
patentees, as vertical agreements, rule of reason treatment should be accorded.  Read 
broadly, the Leegin decision can apply to all vertical price maintenance, whether 
involving resale or first sale under a patent license.89  Hence, research patentees should be 
judged by the rule of reason, as with any upstream party licensing those downstream to 
make or sell its products. 
F. Modern Antitrust Doctrine 
¶37 The trajectory of modern antitrust jurisprudence has drastically departed from per 
se treatment, favoring the rule of reason as “the prevailing standard of analysis.”90  The 
Supreme Court has established that “there is a presumption in favor of a rule-of-reason 
standard,”  and application of per se illegality “[is] appropriate only when [relating] to 91
 
83 Id. at 380 (emphasis added). 
84 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007). 
85 Royal Indus. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 420 F.2d 449, 452 (9th Cir. 1969). 
86 Id. at 453. 
87 Lipstein & Tisch, supra note 23, at 2 (“[C]ourts have nibbled away at [General Electric], leaving it a 
narrow rule . . . .”). 
88 United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926) (“[Patentee] may [use price restraints] . . . 
to secure pecuniary reward.”) (emphasis added). 
89 See Arnold B. Calmann, Antitrust Issues in Licensing, 915 P.L.I. PAT. 449, 481 (2007) (“Leegin 
represents the overturning of the last vestige of per se rules in vertical arrangements.”). 
90 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
91 Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988). 
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conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive . . . ‘[with a] pernicious effect on competition 
and lack of any redeeming virtue.’”92  This modern approach has been applied across the 
board to vertical restraints, including price  and non-price conditions.  93 94
¶38 Especially for research patentees, there are several reasons why per se treatment of 
licenses is inappropriate.  First, as the Court noted in Leegin, “the per se rule is 
appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint 
at issue.”95  However, the industry of upstream research and patenting without also 
manufacturing the inventions is relatively nascent.  Indeed, the Bayh-Dole Act, passed in 
1980,96 effectively established the licensing industry that now exists at research 
universities.97  For such “business relationships where the economic impact of certain 
practices is not immediately obvious,” the rule of reason should apply.  98
¶39 Second, research patentees engage in purely vertical arrangements with their 
manufacturing licensees, as the parties to each transaction exist at “different levels of 
distribution.”99  Modern Supreme Court cases have repeatedly recognized the 
“differences in economic effect between vertical and horizontal agreements,” which 
preclude “reliance on rules governing horizontal restraints when defining rules applicable 
to vertical ones.”100  Hence, the cases discussed above, all involving horizontal 
agreements, should be inapposite to vertical price restraints imposed by research 
patentees. 
G. Economic Incentives of Research Patentees 
¶40 There are also two significant economic reasons why price restraints imposed by 
research patentees are more likely to benefit than hurt consumers, and can result in 
competitive rather than monopolistic prices at market.  First, generally accepted 
economic theory explains that a monopolist derives the benefits of exclusivity from a 
single market.101  As per the “Single Monopoly Profit” theory, an upstream monopolist 
extracts its entire rents from those it sells to directly, and derives no further profit by 
controlling the resale market.102  Hence, even the dissent in Leegin recognized that an 
upstream monopolist must have “special reasons” for imposing RPM contracts, other 
 
92 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
93 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (maximum prices); see also Leegin Creative Leather 
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (RPM). 
94 Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (vertical non-price restraints). 
95 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2713. 
96 See de Larena, supra note 3, at 1374–75. 
97 Bayh-Dole has facilitated widespread emergence of licensing. See id. 
98 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2713 (citing Kahn, 522 U.S. 3). 
99 Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988); see County Materials Corp. v. 
Allan Block Corp., 502 F.3d 730, 736 (7th Cir. 2007). 
100 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2714. 
101 See, e.g., Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly:  Economic Analysis, Legal 
Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 624–25 (1999) (describing the single monopoly 
profit theory). 
102 See Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[T]he extension of monopoly 
power from one to two levels does not necessarily, nor in an obvious way, give . . . added power to raise 
prices.”) (emphasis in original). 
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than an anticompetitive desire to extract additional returns.103  The research patentee will 
similarly derive no added benefits from maintaining monopolistic prices at retail. 
¶41 In fact, the economic incentives of a research patentee align with those of 
consumers, and the licensor benefits from lower prices at retail.  Like the manufacturer in 
Leegin, the research patentee generally has incentives to lower prices in order to increase 
product distribution and generate more royalty revenues from sales.104  Indeed, its 
incentives to boost sales may even be stronger than those of product manufacturers in the 
RPM context.  Unlike producers, research patentees are not subject to product liability,105 
nor do they incur marginal costs for materials or production expenses.106  Rather, once 
development, patent prosecution, and transaction cost overheads are paid, the research 
patentee faces “near-zero” costs per unit licensed.107  Hence, it has few reasons, if any, to 
limit retail output. 
¶42 Conversely, royalty revenues may increase with product distribution, as royalty 
rates need not be tied to product price,108 and are often scalable with increased 
commercial success of the product.109  Hence, research patentees have incentives to boost 
sales as much as possible at the retail level, and will benefit from lower, non-
monopolistic prices to consumers.110  As the Court recognized in Leegin, when “the 
interests of manufacturers and consumers are aligned with respect to retailer profit 
margins,” the rule of reason is appropriate.  In turn, it should apply to research 
patentees.  111
III. BENEFITS OF PRICE RESTRAINTS TO RESEARCH PATENTEES 
¶43 As vertical restraints, price maintenance in licenses by research patentees should be 
assessed under the rule of reason.  This section explicates a specific methodology that 
research patentees could use to enhance product distribution and licensing revenues from 
their patented technologies.  Applying rule of reason analysis, this part finds that the 
 
103 Of course, as the author of the Boston Edison decision, it is no surprise that Justice Breyer conceded 
this point. 
104 127 S. Ct. at 2718 (“[I]n general, the interests of manufacturers and consumers are aligned . . . .”).  
Of course, countervailing interests might at times require raising retail prices via RPM contracts or patent 
license restraints. 
105 See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 n.23 (1977) (“[S]ociety increasingly 
demands that manufacturers assume direct responsibility for the safety and quality of their products.”). 
106 See Willard K. Tom, The DOJ/FTC Report on Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property 
Rights, 21 ANTITRUST 35, 35 (2007) (“[F]ixed costs are high and marginal costs are near zero . . . [for] 
intellectual property . . . .”). 
107 Id. 
108 Royalties can be charged as a fixed amount per unit sold or as a percentage of sale revenues. See 
Sergio Garcia et al., An Introduction to Licensing Technology from Universities at 3, FENWICK & WEST 
LLP, Jan. 6, 2006, available at http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/Publications/IP/university_licensing.pdf. 
109 Id. (“Some of the more common payment structures [include] . . . royalty structures that scale with 
your increasing success in the marketplace.”). 
110 An analogous situation was addressed by the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, in relation to the 
economic incentives of newspaper publishers. See Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692, 701 (8th 
Cir. 1984) (en banc).  Since advertising revenues increased with circulation, the Court concluded that the 
publisher has incentives “to keep the retail price as low as possible,” and consumer interests will thereby be 
promoted. Id. 
111 127 S. Ct. at 2718. 
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methodology proposed has significant procompetitive benefits that should outweigh any 
anticompetitive effects of price control. 
A. A Method to Utilize Price Maintenance in Patent Licensing 
¶44 Patents procured by research institutions are often licensed on an exclusive basis 
for product development and distribution.112  Exclusive licensing shields a licensee from 
competition over the patented product, allowing it to recoup development costs and 
further reap monopoly profits until the end of the patent term.113  Notably, industry 
licensees are not simply being greedy when they seek exclusive licensing from research 
patentees.114  Inventions at research institutions often require further development to 
mature into commercial products,115 and there is inherent risk in new technologies as it is 
difficult to assess commercial potential.116  These are valid reasons for licensees to desire 
immunity from competition.  117
¶45 However, exclusive licensing also causes real problems.  Once a product has been 
fully developed and costs recouped, the exclusive licensee will continue to reap 
monopoly profits at the expense of consumers.118  Furthermore, upon entering an 
exclusive licensing agreement, the patentee may be barred from licensing to other 
research institutions, and may even be restricted from using the invention in its own 
endeavors.119  Many scholars in the field have lamented the impediments thus imposed on 
research.  120
¶46 Hence, there is a genuine need to shield the products of research inventions from 
competition during their inception stages and the periods required to recoup fixed costs.  
Yet, there are equally pressing reasons to avoid exclusive licensing, and to allow 
consumers to realize the benefits of price competition within a shorter timeframe than the 
full patent term.  Temporary vertical price maintenance imposed by a research patentee 
may offer a practical balance between these competing interests. 
¶47 The proposed methodology comprehends two phases in the lifecycles of products 
derived from the inventions of research patentees.121  In Phase I, the patented subject 
matter is further developed, production techniques are refined, distribution methods are 
established, and fixed costs are recouped.  In Phase II, proceeds from sales cover the 
 
112 See de Larena, supra note 3, at 1423–24 (“[I]n practice [universities] frequently grant exclusive 
licenses to companies . . . .”). 
113 See Eisenberg, supra note 6, 1709–10 (“[B]y charging monopoly prices without facing competition . 
. . [a manufacturing licensee] preserves for itself the rents from product development.”). 
114 See generally de Larena, supra note 3, at 1385–86 (“[C]ommercial licensees pressure their university 
licensors for exclusive licenses.”). 
115 See id. at 1414 (“[Typically], the [initial licensee] runs some experiments, [and] further develops the 
technology . . . .”). 
116 See id. at 1381 (“[M]ost university inventions are never picked up by a licensee, and even fewer 
generate big income . . . .”). 
117 See Pulsinelli, supra note 8, at 398 (“[F]irms . . . worry that their competitors [will] wait for them to 
develop the markets and work out kinks in the technology, and then steal their markets . . . .”). 
118 See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1709–10. 
119 de Larena, supra note 3, at 1386 (“[Exclusive licensees] typically use their . . . rights to block 
research by others, even sometimes within the very university that holds the patent.”). 
120 See, e.g., Pulsinelli, supra note 8, at 430–31. 
121 de Larena, supra note 3, at 1414 (describing a typical model of further development of the patented 
technology, followed by product manufacture and distribution). 
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manufacturer’s marginal costs, and royalties are paid to the patentee until the term 
expires.  As mentioned, during Phase I, licensees want insulation from price competition 
in order to mitigate risks and secure a profitable return on investment.  During Phase II, 
exclusive licensees are able to exploit their rights by reaping monopoly rents from 
consumers in excess of development investments.  This exploitation is also inefficient for 
the patentee.  By restricting output to meet demand at the monopoly retail price, the 
licensee curtails potential royalty revenues, whereas the patentee would benefit from 
increased distribution.  122
¶48 Thus, this article proposes that research patentees could impose temporary price 
restraints across multiple non-exclusive licenses.  The initial price floor would be 
sufficient for multiple licensees to recoup development costs.123  However, research 
patentees would not grant exclusive licenses, and would actively seek multiple licensees 
for product development.  Once Phase I is complete, the research patentee would 
terminate or gradually reduce the price restraint, allowing price competition between the 
licensees.  Hence, during Phase II, competition would drive down costs to consumers, in 
advance of the patent’s expiration.  Royalty revenues could similarly increase, as more 
products are demanded by consumers at the lower prices. 
B. Rule of Reason Analysis of the Proposed Method 
¶49 The rule of reason is the “prevailing standard of analysis” in antitrust, and requires 
the fact finder to assess the totality of circumstances at hand in order to determine 
whether the practice constitutes an “unreasonable restraint on competition.”124  Relevant 
factors include nature of the business, reason for the restraint, and effect on 
competition.125  The central determination is whether a practice has “anticompetitive 
effect[s] that [harm] the consumer[,] [or] stimulat[es] competition . . . in the consumer’s 
best interest.”  126
¶50 The first step in rule of reason analysis is to determine whether the party imposing 
the restraint has “market power.”127  Simply put, this is the power to control prices, “the 
ability profitably to maintain prices above, or output below, competitive levels for a 
significant period of time.”128  Without market power, ordinary competition will deter 
any attempts to restrain trade in a manner harmful to consumers.129  Until recently, patent 
owners were presumed to have market power, due to consumers’ “inability to buy the 
 
122 In the manufacturer-retailer model, this is known as the successive monopoly problem.  One strong 
incentive for a firm to vertically-integrate is to avoid a monopoly at the distribution level sapping its profits 
from the monopoly at the manufacturing level. See Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 
1990). 
123 Concededly, this may be infeasible for some products or industries, if a licensee’s development costs 
can only be recouped by selling exclusively at maximal profits for the entire patent term. 
124 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
125 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2007) (citing State Oil v. 
Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1977)). 
126 Id. at 2713. 
127 Id. at 2720 (“[Possible anticompetitive impact] may not be a serious concern unless the relevant 
entity has market power.”). 
128 IP Guidelines, supra note 24, § 2.2 (emphasis added). 
129 See CHARLES J. GOETZ & FRED S. MCCHESNEY, ANTITRUST LAW:  INTERPRETATION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 56–58 (3d ed. 2006). 
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product elsewhere.”130  In Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, the Supreme Court 
invalidated this presumption, instead aligning with “the vast majority of academic 
literature recogniz[ing] that a patent does not necessarily confer market power.”131  The 
proper inquiry is whether substitutes exist for the patented product.  132
¶51 Proving market power involves a highly factual inquiry into the specific markets at 
issue, and consideration of substitutability at both the supply (production) and demand 
(consumption) levels.133  As such, it cannot be assessed in the abstract.  To ensure 
objectivity of this discussion, it will be assumed that the research patentee has market 
power.  Nonetheless, substantial procompetitive benefits serve to validate the proposed 
method. 
¶52 The procompetitive benefits arising from the proposed approach overwhelmingly 
outweigh the disadvantages of maintaining supra-competitive prices.  First, the 
imposition of temporary price maintenance during product development, followed by free 
competition between manufacturers, would be used as an alternative to the exclusive 
licensing practices that prevail today.134  In the exclusive licensing context, monopoly 
rents are imposed upon consumers by the exclusive manufacturer for the duration of the 
patent term.  Furthermore, royalties charged by the patentee only add to the final retail 
price, and impose no constraints on an exclusive manufacturer.  135
¶53 In contrast, the proposed method introduces two forms of beneficial competition.  
During Phase I, manufacturers engage in non-price competition and have incentives to 
develop the highest quality products and the most efficient production and distribution 
lines.  In Phase II, consumer benefit is twofold.  First, price competition drives retail 
prices to marginal cost levels, prior to patent expiration.  Second, the actual marginal cost 
levels should be lower and the product quality improved, due to the non-price 
competition during Phase I. 
¶54 Indeed, non-price competition in Phase I may also lead to differentiation of 
products covered by the same patent.  As the Supreme Court has recognized, promoting 
product differentiation is a legitimate procompetitive justification, as it benefits 
consumers by increasing variety.136  As manufacturers seek to establish market share 
during Phase I, they may develop different variations of the same product, or invest in 
further innovations to the underlying invention.  Hence, even while the price restraint is 
in effect, significant gains are realized by avoiding exclusive licensing and attracting 
multiple licensees. 
 
130 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) (citing United States v. Lowe’s 
Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45–47 (1962)). 
131 Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44 (2006). 
132 Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1410 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(“[T]he definition of a market depends on substitutability on the supply side as well as on the demand 
side.”). 
133 Id. 
134 See de Larena, supra note 3, at 1423–24 (“[I]n practice [universities] frequently grant exclusive 
licenses to companies . . . .”). 
135 See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1709 (“Any royalty obligation that the firm incurs under the patent . . 
. is merely a tax on product development that increases costs and reduces profits.”). 
136 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–02 
(1984) (“In [differentiating its product], [NCAA’s] actions widen consumer choice . . . and hence [are] 
procompetitive.”). 
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¶55 The goal of inducing market entry is itself a recognized procompetitive 
justification.  Even the dissent in Leegin conceded the utility of vertical price 
maintenance to facilitate new entry.137  Describing the situation of a new manufacturer 
maintaining resale prices in order to give retailers incentives to take up its product, 
Justice Breyer described how the restraints enable entry by assuring entrants that they 
“will later recoup their investment.”138  As discussed, price maintenance imposed by the 
research patentee in Phase I similarly entices new manufacturers to enter licenses and 
invest in the technology by assuring their returns on investment.  In light of this important 
benefit, Justice Breyer conceded that he “might agree that the per se rule should be 
slightly modified to allow an exception for . . . ‘new entry.’”139  The purpose and effect of 
the proposed methodology to promote entry of multiple manufacturing licensees weighs 
strongly in favor of legality. 
¶56 Finally, the temporary nature of the restraint and its control by the research patentee 
counsels strongly for legality.  The Leegin Court recognized that the “source of the 
restraint” is an important factor in the rule of reason analysis.140  Here, the determination 
of when to release or reduce the price restraint will be at the patentee’s discretion.  Given 
its economic incentives, a research patentee will relax restraints at the optimal point to 
enhance competition and product distribution. 
¶57 As the Supreme Court has recognized, “manufacturers have an economic interest in 
maintaining as much intrabrand competition as is consistent with the efficient distribution 
of their products.”141  Economic theory largely recognizes that “the manufacturer's 
interest necessarily corresponds with that of the public,”142 in that “a lower retail price 
means increased sales and higher manufacturer revenues.”143  As reiterated in Leegin, 
where the manufacturer (analogously, patentee) initiates the restraint, “there is a special 
reason to believe . . . benefits exist.”144  Since the patentee initiates and controls the price 
restraint, precedent and economic principles favor legality. 
C. Practical Feasibility 
¶58 The proposed transactional method might well face higher practical hurdles than 
legal ones.  While non-exclusive licensing by this approach will benefit research 
patentees and consumers, corporate manufacturers arguably have less incentive to give up 
the monopolies they currently enjoy over the length of the patent term.  This section 
briefly addresses this point. 
¶59 One area of licensee benefit is initial cost savings.  Instead of prompting a price war 
to win exclusive rights, up-front fees should be greatly reduced under this scheme.  Given 
 
137 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2728 (2007). 
138 Id. (emphasis added). 
139 Id. at 2731. 
140 Id. at 2719. 
141 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56 (1977). 
142 Id. (citations omitted). 
143 Id. at 57 n.24 (citing Antitrust Laws—Sherman Act—Vertical Restraints: Enforcement of Resale 
Location Restrictions Is a Per Se Violation of Section One of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 636, 641 
(1975)). 
144 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2729 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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the speculative nature of these technologies,145 the ability to license these inherently risky 
inventions for lower up-front fees should be viewed favorably by corporate executives. 
¶60 Furthermore, a non-exclusive licensing structure could allow companies to enter at 
later stages of product development, with less commitment and greater expectations of 
success.  Those who licensed earlier could in turn benefit from these late entries, by 
licensing their trade secrets regarding manufacturing processes and product 
improvements to the newcomers.  Thus, licensees with the greatest investment could 
recoup the greatest returns, and others could license for lower commitment at less risk 
and correspondingly lower returns. 
¶61 Finally, by outsourcing product development to the initial licensees, subsequent 
licensees could improve their business models.  Rather than investing heavily in 
development and initial licensing in hopes for “blockbuster” products,146 later licensees 
could invest as a means of diversifying existing product lines.  This could hedge the risks 
involved with primary product lines. 
IV. PATENTING AT RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 
¶62 Any discussion of patenting and licensing at universities must consider the 
requirements and implications of the Bayh-Dole Act.147  Before its enactment, 
universities were largely excluded from the patent system.148  Now, in return for federal 
funding and the ability to patent their inventions, universities must license on “reasonable 
terms,” designed to achieve commercial practice of the inventions.149  The Act has 
spurred a dramatic increase in patenting by universities and the proliferation of TTOs for 
portfolio management and licensing.  150
¶63 Nonetheless, there are many problems and inefficiencies created by Bayh-Dole.  
One arises from exclusive licensing, which imposes innovation-retarding restrictions on 
access to patented technologies.151  This offends one of the general purposes of the Act 
itself, “to ensure that inventions . . . are used in a manner to promote free competition and 
enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery.”152  Also, in many 
instances, exclusive licensing has not proven profitable for universities.  As Professor de 
Larena explains, “most schools do not make money from technology transfer.”153  In 
contrast, “[s]ome of the most commonly acclaimed success stories for university 
 
145 See de Larena, supra note 3, at 1381 (“[M]ost university inventions . . . [do not] generate big income 
. . . .”). 
146 This business model has threatened the viability of pharmaceutical giants. See Gary P. Pisano, Can 
Science Be a Business? Lessons from Biotech, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2006, at 117 (describing the 
“shortage of potential blockbuster drugs” that “threatened established pharmaceutical companies”). 
147 35 U.S.C. § 201(f) (2000). 
148 Pulsinelli, supra note 8, at 394. 
149 Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don't We Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls?  The 
Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed upon Patents Deriving in Whole 
or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631, 682 (2001) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 201(f) 
(1994)). 
150 de Larena, supra note 3, at 1412. 
151 See, e.g., id. at 1376 (“[T]he existence of the blocking rights may deter important follow-on research 
. . . .”). 
152 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000) (emphasis added). 
153 de Larena, supra note 3, at 1385. 
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technology transfer involve patents that yield substantial royalty payments through 
nonexclusive licenses . . . .”  154
¶64 Many have argued that consumers are the real losers from exclusive licensing under 
Bayh-Dole.155  Taxpayers front the initial research expenses provided through federal 
funding.156  The university obtains a patent, thereby securing the right to obtain monopoly 
profits from the invention.  Under the framework of exclusive licensing, the 
manufacturing licensee obtains a successive monopoly to the technology, and reaps 
monopoly rents from consumers.157  Consumers thus pay for the upstream research, and 
again for the downstream product at monopoly prices.  158
¶65 Nonetheless, Bayh-Dole expressly requires licensing on “reasonable terms,”159 
which has been interpreted by some scholars to encompass pricing at reasonable, non-
monopolistic levels.160  Scholarship splits as to whether the present subjugation of this 
provision stems from under-enforcement by the government,161 industry pressure and bad 
faith by universities,  or structural deficiencies in the Act itself.  162 163
¶66 As discussed, economic theory suggests that downstream pricing on “reasonable 
terms” is indeed in universities’ best interests, given their situation as research patentees 
realizing revenues from royalty payments.  The methodology outlined above, which 
balances industry interests with those of universities and consumers, could mitigate these 
problems by providing a contractual alternative to exclusive licensing.  Temporary price 
maintenance by research patentees could serve the purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act by 
facilitating competitive downstream pricing of the federally-funded, patented 
technologies. 
¶67 Non-exclusive licensing via the proposed method may also generate additional 
benefits for the research patentees.  The FTC has long recognized the benefits of liberal 
licensing practices, both as economic boons and as tending to “promote the progress of 
science.”164  Former Commissioner Mary Azcuenaga remarked that “intellectual property 
licensing can . . . help integrate complementary intellectual property.”165  Often, 
individual patents represent one component of an overall product, and widespread 
licensing facilitates “combination with complementary factors” towards the development 
of diverse products.   While exclusive licensing locks the technology into the particular 166
 
154 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1710. 
155 See, e.g., id. at 1709. 
156 de Larena, supra note 3, at 1389. 
157 See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1709–10. 
158 de Larena, supra note 3, at 1389–90 (“[R]oyalty cost is . . . passed on to the consumer along with the 
monopoly rents on the resulting product.”). 
159 35 U.S.C. § 201(f) (2000). 
160 See Arno & Davis, supra note 149, at 649–51 (arguing that “reasonable terms” includes pricing); but 
see John H. Raubitschek, Reasonable Pricing—A New Twist for March-In Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 
22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 149, 162–63 (arguing against Arno & Davis). 
161 See generally Arno & Davis, supra note 149. 
162 See de Larena, supra note 3, at 1385–86, 1417–18. 
163 See Pulsinelli, supra note 8, at 481 (“[Federally-funded] researchers . . . should have a limited, 
royalty-free license to make and use for research purposes all inventions developed with federal funds.”). 
164 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
165 Mary L. Azcuenaga, FTC Commissioner, Antitrust/Intellectual Property Claims in High Technology 
Markets, 1995 WL 50293 at 3 (Jan. 26, 1995). 
166 IP Guidelines, supra note 24, § 2.3. 
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use applied by the patentee, liberal licensing “potentially increas[es] the expected returns 
from intellectual property.”  167
¶68 Furthermore, widespread licensing and distribution of the patented invention can 
promote further innovation and the development of improvement technologies.  Patents 
are available on incremental improvements,168 which can be highly profitable.  However, 
practicing the subject matter of an improvement patent often requires a license for the 
original technology.169  If the original is exclusively licensed, improvements may be 
deterred. 
¶69 Finally, for major research universities in particular, widespread distribution of 
patented technologies adds to their prestige and renown.  Indeed, patenting prowess is a 
hot area of competition among research institutions.170  By restricting distribution, 
exclusive licensing could undermine this prestige. 
¶70 By abandoning exclusive licensing practices, university patentees accommodate the 
purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act, while realizing economic and non-monetary benefits.  
The proposed methodology may offer research patentees a viable contractual alternative 
to exclusive licensing. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶71 As the dust settles from the “legal turbulence” caused by Leegin, it becomes clear 
that price maintenance by research patentees should be judged under the rule of reason.  
Due to the substantial procompetitive benefits that may inure from temporary, patentee-
controlled price restraints, their legality should be assured under the antitrust laws.  Such 
license provisions facilitate non-price competition at the manufacturing level, leading to 
enhanced quality, efficiency, and product differentiation.  In turn, they enable 
competitive prices at market, in advance of patent expiration. 
¶72 Finally, this approach may balance the interests of university patentees and industry 
licensees, and steer negotiations away from the inefficient exclusive licensing practices 
that prevail today.  Thus, the express purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act can be served, and 
current obstacles impeding research and precluding availability of new technologies can 
be overcome.  In conclusion, this article retorts to the Leegin dissent:  “Bring on the 
turbulence, and let it unsettle the laws of patent licensing!” 
 
167 Id. (emphasis added). 
168 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2005). 
169 See Pulsinelli, supra note 8, at 413–15 (discussing blocking patents). 
170 See de Larena, supra note 3, at 1381 (noting the prestige from patenting). 
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